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I. INTRODUCTION
The securities antifraud provision is a bastard. It has no
indisputable parentage; its existence is attributed to a federal statute,
but its features are borrowed from state law, a body of law that the
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enacting Congress presumably believed was inadequate.1 Why would
Congress borrow from state law that it considered deficient? Even
though the antifraud provision has come of age largely through judicial
construction similar to the laudatory process that underlies our
common law, critics attack the antifraud provision like no comparable
common-law development. To many scholars, private antifraud suits
are not viewed as a net benefit, but as a menace.2 As a consequence, the
fate of future suits under the antifraud provision always appears to
hang in the balance of the next Supreme Court decision. The
uncertainty is because most Supreme Court decisions construing the
statute have largely restricted the scope of the antifraud provision; over
the years, the Supreme Court has limited the antifraud private cause
of action through decisions regarding who has standing to sue,3 what
constitutes culpable conduct,4 and who is responsible for fraudulent
conduct.5 On each of these issues, the Supreme Court has restrained
the scope of the private action. Following Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut
Retirement Plans and Trust Funds,6 the vultures once again circle the
antifraud provision.
Lurking in the shadows is a potentially mortal blow to the
securities class action because it appears the Supreme Court is poised

1.
See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 244 n.22 (1987) (observing that actions
under Rule 10b-5 are “designed to add to the protections provided investors by the common law”).
2.
See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on
the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 161–63 (2011) (arguing that SEC enforcement is less costly and
more productive than private enforcement); Joseph A. Grundfest, Why Disimply, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 727, 746–48 (1995) (arguing that the SEC should exercise its rulemaking authority to address
features of Rule 10b-5 that lead to abusive litigation practices); Amanda M. Rose, Reforming
Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private
Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1354–58 (2008) (proposing that the SEC
serve a clearing function for the conduct of private securities class actions).
3.
See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731, 739–41 (1975) (imposing
a rigid requirement that a private litigant must be an actual purchaser or seller in connection with
the fraud, reasoning that otherwise, the cause of action would invite costly and “vexatious”
litigation).
4.
See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474–80 (1977) (holding that antifraud
provision proscribes material misrepresentation or manipulation, not breaches of fiduciary duty
or unfair conduct); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201–05 (1976) (holding that
provision only reaches misrepresentations committed with scienter); see also Morrison v. Nat’l
Austl. Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2881 (2010) (holding that antifraud provision does not apply
extraterritorially).
5.
See Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011)
(holding that responsibility for material misrepresentation extends only to those who had ultimate
authority over the statement, including its content and whether and how the statement would be
released); Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 175–77 (1994)
(holding that those who merely aid and abet another’s violation are not liable under the antifraud
provision).
6.
133 S. Ct. 1184, 1184 (2013).
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to address an aspect of causation that strikes at the heart of such
suits—the ability of injured investors to aggregate their claims on the
theory that the defendant’s misrepresentation constituted fraud on the
market. Unlike the other significant elements of the antifraud private
cause of action, Supreme Court precedent on causation is something of
a mixed bag. While there are Supreme Court precedents addressing
causation that favor plaintiffs,7 the more recent forays into this subject
suggest a more conservative tilt.8 That trend, and the overall
unwelcome reception the antifraud provision has received on other
issues, may just document the belief that with respect to the antifraud
provision, once a bastard always a bastard. This denouncement need
hardly be the case. This Article takes a more hopeful course by
clarifying the role that causation should play in private securities
litigation and showing how that objective can be achieved within
current Supreme Court formulations of causation.
Most investors who believe they have been defrauded in
connection with trades on a market, like those in Amgen, cannot
practically pursue their claims other than through a class action.
Within this context, a court’s decisions both to certify the class and to
deny a motion to dismiss define the ultimate fate of the suit. For the
risk-averse defendant who loses each of these skirmishes, the optimal
strategy is to settle the suit. In contrast, for investors in such suits, class
certification is not just one of the hurdles that must be successfully
vaulted to obtain compensation for damages caused by the
misrepresentation; it frequently is the highest of the hurdles. Failing
certification, there is no effective means for investors to assert their
claims; it is only through aggregation of claims that a suit is practicable
since most claimants’ losses are not large enough to justify the expense
of their individual prosecution. Requiring that investors establish the
misrepresentation’s materiality as a precondition to class certification
7.
Plaintiffs have enjoyed some success on the scope of materiality. See, e.g., Matrixx
Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1321 (2011) (holding materiality of possible side
effects of a pharmaceutical company’s major product can exist even without statistically significant
evidence of a causal link); Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1095–96 (1991)
(holding opinion statements that are inconsistent with objective evidence between the defendant
are facts); see also Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 652 (2010) (holding statute of limitations
does not begin to run until a plaintiff does discover, or a reasonably diligent plaintiff could have
discovered, facts constituting a violation).
8.
See, e.g., Janus Capital, 131 S. Ct. at 2302–03 (interpreting scope of primary participant
narrowly so it reaches only one with ultimate control of a false statement’s dissemination);
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 152–53 (2008) (rejecting
scheme liability with the result that those who actively conspire to assist another in issuing false
financial statements are not primary participants); Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336,
345–46 (2005) (imposing a requirement that complaint must allege facts supporting the claim that
misrepresentation caused the investor to suffer an economic loss).

3 - Cox PAGE (Do Not Delete)

1722

11/22/2013 3:51 PM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:6:1719

inserts another point of friction into the investor’s access to the
settlement arena. For defendants, this requirement is one more means
to avoid settling a suit.
Therefore, the sine qua non for any securities class action is
successfully invoking the fraud-on-the-market approach to establishing
causation. Fraud on the market was embraced by the Supreme Court
in a 4 to 2 decision in Basic Inc. v. Levinson,9 a case that appears
destined to be revisited, likely soon.10 This Article argues that lower
courts have misunderstood Basic. The prevailing misunderstanding is
attributable to the Basic court’s failure to comprehend the foundations
of its own reasoning: the meaning and implications of the efficient
market hypothesis.
Because Supreme Court precedent is difficult to reverse, this
Article does not seek to correct Basic. Instead, this Article counsels
reorientation, not correction. More specifically, the Author argues that
the future course should be set by the majority opinion and Scalia’s
dissenting opinion in Amgen, as they more clearly illuminate the best
path for future securities class actions. When fraud on the market, or
any other dimension of causation in private securities law claims, comes
before the Court, Amgen should provide the resolving foundation and
framework, not Basic.
II. BASIC UNVARNISHED
The Court first recognized fraud on the market in Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, where on three occasions over a thirteen-month period Basic
publicly disclaimed any knowledge of a company development that
would explain the increased trading in its stock. In fact, Basic was
engaged in negotiations for its own acquisition.11 When Basic
announced it would merge with Combustion Engineering, its stock
soared. Disappointed investors who sold Basic’s shares in the interval
between the company’s first denial and the merger announcement
brought a class action alleging the misstatements were materially
misleading because Basic had been locked in discussions and
negotiations with Combustion during the thirteen-month period. Their
suit would ultimately establish the parameters within which the
securities class action suit survives, if only barely at times.
9.
485 U.S. 224, 249–50 (1988).
10. In Amgen, Justice Alito openly invited reconsideration of fraud on the market. 133 S. Ct.
at 1204 (Alito J., concurring). In a portion of Justice Thomas’s dissent joined by Justices Kennedy
and Scalia, Justice Thomas labels Basic itself as “questionable.” Id. at 1208 n.4 (Thomas J.,
dissenting).
11. Basic, 485 U.S. at 227.
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In addition to holding that the materiality of speculative
information should be the product of the event’s magnitude and the
probability of its occurrence,12 the Court upheld fraud on the market.
The Court held reliance was required for private suits under the
antifraud provision. However, the slight majority of four of the
participating Justices held that investors are presumed to rely on the
security’s price reflected in all publicly available information in welldeveloped markets.13
While clearly holding “that reliance is an element of a Rule 10b5 cause of action”14 and explaining that “[r]eliance provides the
requisite causal connection between a defendant’s misrepresentation
and a plaintiff’s injury,”15 Basic provides an important qualification to
these conclusions by observing that “[t]here is . . . more than one way to
demonstrate the causal connection.”16 Basic references the Court’s
earlier decisions in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, viewing it
as a decision in which reliance was dispensed with (rather than, as
argued below, being based on an array of facts from which reliance was
easily deduced), as well as Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. (where the
requisite causation was met by the necessity of the proxy solicitation,
not the particular defect in the proxy materials, being essential to
consummating the alleged harmful transaction).17 Blackmun’s majority
opinion in Basic holds that reliance was satisfied by allegations that the
investors relied on the integrity of the price reflected in the market.
Notably, only once did the Court in Basic expressly reference the
concept of an “efficient market,” and then only when quoting the
approach taken by the court of appeals below.18 More frequently, the
Court used the less technical adjectives “developed,”19 “welldeveloped,”20 or “modern”21 when referring to securities markets on
which investors presumably rely for securities’ prices that reflect
publicly available information:
The fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an open and developed
securities market, the price of a company’s stock is determined by the available material
information regarding the company and its business. . . . Misleading statements will
therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 238–39 (citing SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968)).
Id. at 246–47.
Id. at 243.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 243 (citing Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384–85 (1970)).
Id. at 248 & n.27.
Id. at 241, 244 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160–61 (3d Cir. 1986)).
Id. at 246.
Id. at 243.
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misstatements. . . . The causal connection between the defendants’ fraud and the
plaintiffs’ purchase of stock in such a case is no less significant than in a case of direct
reliance on misrepresentations.22

Justice Blackmun further supported the plurality opinion by
contrasting personal, face-to-face decisionmaking with impersonal
market transactions:
In face-to-face transactions, the inquiry into an investor’s reliance upon information is
into the subjective pricing of that information by that investor. With the presence of a
market, the market is interposed between seller and buyer and, ideally, transmits
information to the investor in the processed form of a market price. Thus the market is
performing a substantial part of the valuation process performed by the investor in a faceto-face transaction. The market is acting as the unpaid agent of the investor, informing
him that given all the information available to it, the value of the stock is worth the
market price.23

The Court approved the presumption used by the lower courts,
which stated that “persons who had traded Basic shares had done so in
reliance on the integrity of the price set by the market.”24 Note that the
presumed reliance is not on any particular information that may have
impacted a security’s price but on the general belief that financially
significant information may impact the security’s price. Importantly,
the Court reached this conclusion because it found a strong
congressional objective to facilitate investor reliance on the “integrity”
of securities markets. It further supported its conclusion regarding how
stock prices are formed in well-developed markets.25 While lower court
decisions subsequent to Basic consistently condition its application on
a finding that the market in question is an “efficient” one, Basic referred
more generally to “developed,” “well-developed,” or “modern” markets.
It did not invoke the “efficient market” moniker used by economists to
describe the hypothesized performance of capital markets. Importantly,

22. Id. at 241–42 (quoting Peil, 806 F.2d at 1160–61). The reasoning adopted in Basic was
more fully developed earlier in a leading fraud-on-the-market case, Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d
891 (9th Cir. 1975). Blackie concluded that:
[The investor] relies generally on the supposition that the market price is validly set
and that no unsuspected manipulation has artificially inflated the price, and thus
indirectly on the truth of the representations underlying the stock price whether he is
aware of it or not, the price he pays reflects material misrepresentations.
Id. at 907. The court further supported its position by concluding the approach was consistent with
the antifraud statute to “foster an expectation that securities markets are free from fraud an
expectation on which purchasers should be able to rely.” Id.; see also Peil, 806 F.2d at 1161 (“In an
open and developed market, the dissemination of material misrepresentations or withholding of
material information typically affects the price of the stock, and purchasers generally rely on the
price of the stock as a reflection of its value.”). Basic also held that fraud on the market was
consistent with Congress’s intent. See 485 U.S. at 245–46.
23. 485 U.S. at 244 (quoting In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D. Tex. 1980)).
24. Id. at 245.
25. Id. at 246.
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Basic anchors its approach on the grounds that historically justify
courts’ reliance on presumptions, namely “fairness, public policy, and
probability, as well as judicial economy.”26 To further support
presuming investor reliance, Basic invoked the contemporary empirical
evidence of stock-price formation and related commentary on the
implications of that literature for the conduct of securities class actions
as support with respect to the probability component of the factors
considered to invoke resort to a presumption of reliance.27
III. THE POST-BASIC MUDDLE
Post-Basic lower court decisions have considerably narrowed its
holding regarding fraud on the market by seeking evidence of speed or
accuracy of price formation as a predicate for certifying class actions on
the basis of fraud on the market. 28 With some consistency, for example,
lower courts have withheld class certification on the basis of fraud on
the market where there is evidence that a security does not reflect all
public information. In In re PolyMedica Corp. Securities Litigation, the
First Circuit reversed the district court’s certification of the class when
it found that the defendant shares were traded in a market where the
security’s price rapidly reflects only most material information.29 The
First Circuit vacated the certification and remanded the case so that
the district court could consider certification pursuant to the First
Circuit’s standard.30 The panel reasoned that the presumption of
investor reliance is valid only when the market is efficient. The panel
defined market efficiency as when the market rapidly reflects all
information relevant to the company’s value.31
PolyMedica also concluded that efficiency does not require proof
that the particular security’s price, after reflecting “all” public

26. Id. at 245.
27. Id. at 246 n.24 (citing to authorities reviewing studies bearing on the efficient market
hypothesis).
28. See, e.g., Unger v. Amedisys, Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 322 (5th Cir. 2005). Unger denied class
certification for a suit involving securities traded in the Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board because
small-capitalization issuer traded in a less-organized market was not considered efficient. Id.
(“[T]he available material information concerning the stock translates into an effect on the market
price and supports a class-wide presumption of reliance.”). Suits have fared no better for shares
traded on the NASDAQ National Market. See Bell v. Ascendant Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 307, 315
(5th Cir. 2005) (emphasizing turnover as a percentage of outstanding shares, not the particular
exchange, when assessing whether shares were efficiently traded).
29. 432 F.3d 1, 10–11 (1st Cir. 2005).
30. Id. at 19.
31. Id. at 14.
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information, is accurate.32 It is sufficient that the price responds rapidly
to financially significant information. This is commonly referred to as
the market being “informationally efficient.” Because prices can vary
from the securities’ intrinsic value—a matter on which investors likely
hold different beliefs—investors in such a market can reasonably
believe a security is still worthy of being purchased or sold. Investors
can reasonably believe the market has not correctly valued the security
notwithstanding the richness of public information about the company’s
future. That is, PolyMedica envisions that even in an efficient market,
investors can garner positive returns on the basis of publicly available
information.
PolyMedica and the numerous other decisions that share its
holding are paradoxical.33 Pursuant to this approach, investor reliance
is reasonable and hence presumed for securities whose prices quickly
respond to financially significant information. At the same time, these
courts do not require so-called fundamental efficiency (i.e., that the
resulting price reflects the security’s intrinsic value). Essentially, these
courts recognize that all investors do not assume the current
trustworthiness of the price vis-à-vis the shares’ probable intrinsic
value. Thus, notwithstanding the public availability of information,
reasonable investors in such a market can believe that the price may
not reflect the security’s intrinsic value, which leads to opportunities
for returns.34 On the one hand, this position seems entirely correct since
32. The opinion takes great care to distinguish informational efficiency from fundamental
efficiency where the former refers to the market’s response to financially significant information,
and the latter refers to a market where the ultimate response is an accurate pricing of the security.
Id. at 14–17.
33. See, e.g., Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 368 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[A]n efficient
market . . . adjusts rapidly to reflect all new information.”); Greenberg v. Crossroads Sys., Inc., 364
F.3d 657, 661 n.6 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[I]n an efficient market, it is assumed that all public information
concerning a company is known to the market and reflected in the market price of the company’s
stock.”); No. 84 Emp’r-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v. Am. W. Holding Corp., 320
F.3d 920, 947 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[I]n a modern and efficient securities market, the market price of a
stock incorporates all available public information.”); GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 272
F.3d 189, 208 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that in an efficient marketplace, “stock prices reflect all
available relevant information about the stock’s economic value”); Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155,
1163 n.2 (10th Cir. 2000) (“[I]n an open, efficient, and developed market, where millions of shares
are traded daily, the investor must rely on the market to perform a valuation process which
incorporates all publicly available information, including misinformation.”); Kowal v. MCI
Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“[I]n an efficient securities market all
publicly available information regarding a company’s prospects has been reflected in its shares’
prices.”); Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 198 (6th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he price of an
actively traded security in an open, well-developed, and efficient market reflects all the available
information about the value of a company.”).
34. See generally Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and Competitive
Price Systems, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 246 (1976) (arguing that because investors have quite different
levels of information, it is not reasonable to assume that at any point in time the security’s price
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financial theorists all concur that investors have heterogeneous
expectations. Moreover, arbitrage is unlikely to eliminate material
price differences that exist in light of such investor heterogeneity. On
the other hand, if fraud on the market is only applied where investors
are assumed to be unable to earn an above-average return based on
public information, the courts appear to be invoking a different notion
of market efficiency than is defensible under contemporary views of the
hypothesis.
Courts should step back from the rhetoric of market efficiency
and instead observe what appears to be implicit in the holdings of cases
like PolyMedica: investors believe that market-determined prices are
noisy and inaccurate rather than a perfect reflection of all information.
Therefore, market pricing is not perfect vis-à-vis the investor’s
assessment of the security’s return possibilities. If these are indeed the
features of an efficient market, then why should courts limit fraud on
the market to such an elite subset of publicly traded securities? That is,
if evidence of accuracy in pricing is not a condition for fraud on the
market—so that fraud on the market is applicable where prices are
noisy—there can be little justification for the courts to limit fraud on
the market to large-capitalization, publicly traded firms.
A. Inability to Test the Thesis
To untangle the post-Basic morass, one must begin with the
courts’ understanding of market efficiency. At the core of the lower
courts’ interpretation of Basic is the belief that markets can be
separated by the court’s notion of efficiency. First, the lower courts
assume that, investors in markets believed to be efficient rely on the
security’s price to accurately reflect truthful information, whereas
courts believe that investors in inefficient markets cannot be assumed
to so rely. Second, and implicit in the prior statement, courts assume
that the security’s price of any security that does not generally trade
efficiently will not be affected by any release of information. Courts
therefore conclude that investors cannot be presumed to rely on
information of any type ever being reflected in the security’s price.
These are important assumptions; they not only artificially and
unreasonably divide markets but also prevent any discrimination in
assumptions regarding just how information impacts an individual
security if that security is traded on a market that falls in the broadly

will perfectly reflect the information investors have; consequently, prices are not likely to transfer
information from the informed to the less informed investors).
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defined inefficient category. Neither assumption is intuitively obvious,
and both likely lack empirical support.
Because there are no reliable models for determining the
“correct” price of a security, it is not possible to determine whether all
information, or even some information, is fully and rapidly impounded
into a security’s price, such that an abnormal return would not be
possible by investors based on such information.35 That is, the
supposition underlying contemporary applications of fraud on the
market is that investors in efficient markets believe that a security’s
price reflects publicly available information regardless of whether that
information is accurate or misleading. Pursuant to this supposition,
investors cannot earn an above-average return by trading purely on
public information. Correlatively, according to contemporary
interpretations of Basic, since securities traded in inefficient markets
do not reflect all public information, investors do not rely on the marketpricing process as they would in an efficient market.
Determining whether markets reflect information so robustly
requires knowing what the “correct” price should be in light of the
information. On this point, models fail us. Moreover, investors harbor
heterogeneous views on the appropriate price of a security in light of
their common knowledge of the information about the security. With no
reliable model identifying the “correct” price, how can we conclude that
a particular security not only moved to that price upon release of the
information, but did so rapidly? And, if investors disagree about what
the “correct” price should be, which one of their multiple viewpoints is
the correct “correct” price? Leading economists have long pointed out
that the dichotomy between efficient and inefficient markets is neither
workable nor justified.36 None of these points appear to support the

35. Alon Brav & J.B. Heaton, Market Indeterminacy, 28 J. CORP. L. 517, 521 (2003):
Market efficiency requires that an asset price fully and immediately reflect available
information, such that no investor can earn abnormal expected returns by trading on
the available information at the current price. In order to determine whether prices are
efficient or not, we must be able to determine whether the current price reflects all
available information and is “correct” such that no investor can invest at that price and
expect to earn abnormal returns. That is, we need a model of “fundamental value” into
which we put the “available information” and out of which we receive a price at which
no abnormal expected returns are possible. If the current price is lower than the
calculated price, then positive expected abnormal returns probably exist. If the current
price is higher than the calculated price, then negative expected abnormal returns
probably exist. In either case, we must be able to compare the current price to a
predicted “correct” price to determine if the current price is efficient or not.
(footnote omitted).
36. Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529 (1986); Lawrence H. Summers, Does the Stock Market
Rationally Reflect Fundamental Values?, 41 J. FIN. 591 (1986). Joining the academics is one who
has toiled long and well in markets, George Soros. George Soros, My Market Theory: Forget
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conclusion that investors do in fact rely on the market-pricing process
to establish a price that represents the shares’ intrinsic value. On the
other hand, they likely do assume that security prices are not rigged or
otherwise impacted by false information (i.e., they rely on the overall
honesty of securities markets). But, do investors rely on some markets
more than others, as the courts’ binary view of markets—either efficient
or inefficient—appears to assume?
There are multiple mechanisms that cause some security prices,
on average, to be less volatile and to respond more rapidly than others.37
This does not suggest, however, that such a response means that the
security is efficiently priced for the reasons examined above. It is not,
therefore, possible to extrapolate from generalized findings of the
security’s responsiveness to information either that the particular
security has been priced efficiently or that investors in that security
placed their reliance on the security being so priced. Any such
conclusion would be specious.38 If the reliance element is understood as
an element of causation, then the view of Professors Macey, Miller,
Mitchell, and Netter advanced three decades ago remains wise
guidance today: the efficient-versus-inefficient distinction must give
way to objective evidence. This evidence would most likely take the form
of a well-designed event study measuring whether the alleged fraud
produces a statistically significant effect on the security’s price. By
focusing on what can be empirically observed, judicial resources could
be more appropriately directed to a finite inquiry rather than an
amorphous, unsound, and irrelevant inquiry about whether a
particular security was efficiently priced.39 Thus, reliance should be

Theories, WALL. ST. J., Jan. 8, 2001, at A33 (arguing that the theory regarding market efficiency
distorts reality).
37. See, e.g., Brad M. Barber et al., The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory and the Indicators of
Common Stocks Efficiency, 19 J. CORP. L. 285 (1994) (stating that volume and number of analysts
enhance speed of price change); Victor L. Bernard, Christine Botosan & Gregory D. Phillips,
Challenges to the Efficient Market Hypothesis: Limits to the Applicability of Fraud-on-the-Market
Theory, 73 NEB. L. REV. 781 (1994) (examining factors likely to support efficient pricing of
securities); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REV. 549 (1984) (reasoning that relative burdens to access and to interpret information
impacts both the likelihood of and speed at which stock prices respond to information; thus,
whatever information is implicit in past stock prices can easily be accessed and therefore reflected
in stock prices whereas private information by insiders is not easily accessed; thus, insiders enjoy
an unerodible advantage, which is why there is no evidence of the so-called strong form of market
efficiency).
38. Jonathan R. Macey et al., Lessons from Financial Economics: Materiality, Reliance, and
Extending the Reach of Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 77 VA. L. REV. 1017, 1018 (1991).
39. See id. at 1021.
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presumed where there is reliable evidence of such a statistically
significant effect.40
If there is a good deal of noise surrounding the pricing of largecapitalization firms’ securities, which are closely followed by numerous
analysts because the markets are heavily populated by institutional
traders, why should fraud on the market not apply to other noisy
markets? If investors rely on the integrity of the market-pricing
mechanism for large-capitalization firms, what persuasive evidence
suggests that they do not similarly rely for small firms, especially if the
pricing process of both markets is guided by heterogeneous expectations
regarding an individual security’s value?
No doubt Basic and the fraud-on-the-market theory’s greatest
failing is due to their timing in the history of economics. Each occurred
before economists fully developed important refinements and
qualifications to the efficient market hypothesis.41 The hypothesis’s
prescriptions were likely biased because the nature of the
announcements studied were of the type that tended to elicit a strong
response (e.g., unexpected earnings, merger, or significant change in
dividends). Moreover, the early studies examined the market response
to financially significant announcements only within a brief window.42
Those studies did not examine whether, over some longer period, price
formation is an ongoing, rather than rapid, process. Fraud-on-themarket courts, after accepting an early understanding of the
40. Macey et al. support focusing on the fraud’s impact on the stock price by applying the
same reasoning advanced in Basic:
An investor who buys or sells stock at the price set by the market does so in reliance on
the integrity of that price. Because most publicly available information is reflected in
market price, an investor’s reliance on any public material misrepresentations,
therefore, may be presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b-5 action.
Id. (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988)) (footnote omitted). There is a strong
caveat to requiring observed stock price before finding that a material misrepresentation impacted
investors. The approach works well for the material misstatement of unexpected news but, as
developed later, is poorly suited to the pure omission case or a misstatement case that confirms
investor expectations. In these two instances, the observation should shift from the moment of the
false utterance to when the corrective disclosure is made. At that time, a noticeable price correction
corroborates an otherwise bald assertion of material omission or misstatement. These points are
developed later.
41. See generally Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to
the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 667–69 (2003) (reviewing qualifications linked to
heterogeneous investor expectations, limits on arbitrage, and social-psychological biases that
impact securities pricing).
42. See William H. Beaver, The Information Content of Annual Earnings Announcements, 6
J. ACCT. RES. 67, 70 (1968); Peter Lloyd Davies, Stock Prices and the Publication of Second-Hand
Information, 51 J. BUS. 43, 46 (1978); Eugene F. Fama, The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New
Information, 10 INT’L ECON. REV. 1, 4 (1969); Eugene F. Fama, The Behavior of Stock Market
Prices, 38 J. BUS. 34, 45 (1965); Michael Firth, The Information Content of Large Investment
Holdings, 30 J. FIN. 1265, 1269 (1975).
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hypothesis, have not refined that understanding with contemporary
insights regarding how markets price securities. Today, there is less
clarity regarding the prescriptive qualities of the efficient market
hypothesis. It remains a hypothesis, but one that is greatly qualified.
B. Misapplied Theory and Data
Post-Basic decisions have developed an array of criteria to
determine if the security that is the subject of the suit was traded in an
efficient market and, hence, if fraud on the market is an available cause
of action. The criteria focus on daily trading volume, the number of
analysts following the security, the presence of institutional ownership,
and even whether the issuer is eligible for certain regulatory
dispensations the SEC makes available to larger capitalization
issuers.43 The courts believe that when each criterion is present, a
security is more likely to be priced efficiently.
In a classic article on understanding market efficiency,
Professors Gilson and Kraakman insightfully make the point that
whether information is impounded quickly in a security’s price depends
a good deal on a range of externalities related to the particular bit of
information.44 In part they reason that it is the message and the
medium, not the market itself, that explain efficient pricing.45 Thus, we
might find that stock prices themselves convey very little new
information about prospective price movements because the prices are
easily and widely observed and, hence, their information content can be
easily extrapolated. At the other extreme, a person in possession of
43. See, e.g., Binder v. Gillespie, 184 F.3d 1059, 1065 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying five factors to
determine an efficient market: high weekly volume, number of security analysts that follow and
report on stock, presence of marketmakers and arbitrageurs, eligibility to use SEC Form S-3, and
cause-and-effect relationship between news events and immediate price response); Cammer v.
Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989) (using same factors). As developed later in this Article,
the nature of the announcement can be expected to affect the relationship between the
announcement and a stock-price reaction to that announcement. Thus, generalized observations
of the efficiency of a security’s normal pricing may be substantially qualified by the nature of the
announcement itself. One study of efficiency, focused on quarterly report announcements, found
that only two of the preceding factors appear relevant to relative efficiency in pricing securities—
volume of trading and number of analysts for the security. See Barber et al., supra note 37, at 290
(finding that only volume of trade and number of analysts reporting on a stock accurately
differentiated between efficient and inefficient stocks). For an early critique arguing that there is
no reliable litmus test for determining ex ante whether a security trades in an efficient market,
see Jonathan R. Macey, The Fraud on the Market Theory: Some Preliminary Issues, 74 CORNELL
L. REV. 923, 925 (1989) (discussing difficulties of determining whether securities trade in an
efficient market).
44. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 37, at 597–98 (noting externalities such as
information costs have a significant impact on market efficiency).
45. See id.
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nonpublic information derives a significant advantage over others
because the acquisition costs to noninsiders are so formidable. It is just
too costly and time consuming for outsiders to acquire such nonpublic
information. Occupying a large space between these two extremes is
public information; not only is there some friction in accessing public
information but the processing costs in many instances likely slow the
reflection of that information in the security’s price. We can expect that
not all public information will be impounded in a security’s price with
the same alacrity, or perhaps with any quickness at all. That is,
message as well as medium likely impacts the quickness with which a
security’s price reflects particular information. Therefore, a continuum
likely exists regarding whether and how rapidly a security’s price will
reflect public information in which the nature of the information is as
significant as other variables, such as the relative size of the security’s
issuer, number of analysts that follow it, and presence of arbitrageurs.
Hence, even for a security traded in an efficient market, as in Amgen,
we should expect some types of newly released information to impact
the security’s price more quickly than other types of information,
notwithstanding the fact that each announcement is material.
Thus, even though a company’s shares are traded on the Overthe-Counter Bulletin Board (“OTCBB”), we can reasonably expect that
an unexpected announcement that the company secured a government
contract that will quadruple earnings will cause a fairly rapid positive
price response. It may well be the case that less dramatic news about
that company may take longer to influence its price. There appears
little reason to support the notion that slowness of stock-price reaction
in the less dramatic announcement detracts from the trustworthiness
of observing the stock’s reaction to the unexpected government contract.
Moreover, there appears to be no rational basis to categorically conclude
that investors do not rely on stock prices to reflect dramatic
announcements; therefore, the tenets underlying Basic’s presumed
reliance should hold at least in such instances. Furthermore, a clear
implication of the Gilson and Kraakman externality hypothesis is that
the world cannot easily be divided between markets that are
consistently efficient and those that are not. Nonetheless, the lower
courts’ contemporary analysis holds that a fraud-on-the-market action
is not available even if an OTCBB-traded company deceives its
investors by falsely announcing a large government contract.
Equally disturbing is the serious disconnect between the lower
courts’ criteria for determining market efficiency and the efficient
market literature. The intellectual bedrock supporting the efficient
market hypothesis is the numerous event studies conducted in the
1970s and 1980s that collectively reported on how quickly stock prices
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were observed, on a portfolio basis, to respond to various corporate
announcements.46 The early stock-price studies clustered necessarily
around the University of Chicago Center for Research in Security Prices
database that provided stock prices, focusing on large, publicly traded
firms. In this way, the investigators were similar to the person in the
classic tale who was looking at night for his car keys, not where he had
parked his car, but rather in the vicinity of the street lamp because
there he could see. Also, since the initial empirical work focused on
testing the validity of the efficient market hypothesis itself, the studies
naturally concentrated on securities that were more likely to have
conditions believed to lead to a security’s efficient pricing. In doing so,
researchers did not cull the database via the litmus test courts have
developed regarding number of analysts, market capitalization or, for
that matter, trading volume. They instead focused more broadly, using
companies that were included in commonly used stock indexes such as
the Dow Jones Industrial or Standard and Poor’s 500. To be sure, larger
firms, in terms of market capitalization and trading volume, coupled
with the presence of institutional trading and a larger number of
analysts likely cause the price reaction to be quicker. But as Gilson and
Kraakmann observe, efficiency is not binary, but rather a continuum.47
And, more recent empirical studies do report on how, and how rapidly,
price movements occur for over-the-counter securities, even those
traded in the unregulated “Pink Sheet” market.48 Moreover, absent a
compelling argument why the speed of price response should determine
fraud on the market’s application more than the ultimate price change
itself, foreclosing the application of fraud on the market to instances in
which the price response on average occurs faster is arbitrary.
Certainly, the arbitrariness of focusing on hypothetical quickness is
glaring when there is evidence that a defendant company’s shares
actually moved dramatically and quickly in response to a disclosure
that is at the heart of the suit. Furthermore, there is no empirical

46. For this qualification to the early studies supporting the efficient market hypothesis, see
Stout, supra note 41, at 653–57 (reasoning that early work focused on merger announcements and
the like, which were not just significant, but also widely available in contrast to more regular
announcements of corporate events).
47. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 37, at 565–66.
48. See Laura Frieder & Jonathan Zittrain, Spam Works: Evidence from Stock Touts and
Corresponding Market Activity 11–12 (Harvard Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 135, 2007), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=920553 (reporting that trading activity
increased from four percent to seventy percent on day announcement touting stock appeared);
Kate Litvak, Summary Disclosure and the Efficiency of the OTC Market: Evidence from the Recent
Pink Sheets Experiment 6–10 (Dec. 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1443595 (observing return changes following announcement
characterizing firms according to relative disclosure practices pursued).
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evidence that investors are less reliant on price or the noisiness of price
across various markets.
C. Divining Efficiency and Fraud from Stock Prices
Post-Basic courts have confounded their refinement of the
efficient market hypothesis through undue reliance on stock prices in
resolving key elements of antifraud suits. They have developed the
following sequence in the analysis to resolve otherwise-ticklish factual
questions posed by the suit. Material information always moves a
stock’s price if the market is efficient. Hence, if there is no observable
price reaction following an alleged misrepresentation, then either the
information omitted or misstated was not material or the security is not
efficiently traded. Thus, investor reliance cannot be presumed.49 As this
Article will show, assessing market efficiency or materiality by
observing stock-price changes is trickier than the courts assume.
In re Burlington Coat Factory Securities Litigation is the leading
case holding that the absence of stock-price response equates to the
information not being material.50 On September 20, 1994, Burlington’s
stock dropped nearly thirty percent when it announced that its fourthquarter and full-year results were below the levels of a year earlier.
Investors claimed that Burlington earlier misled them by, among other
representations, falsely reporting that 1993 earnings included $12.2
million in extra sales due to that fiscal period having an extra week (i.e.,
fifty-third week). The necessary effect of this fiscal year phenomenon,
according to the plaintiffs, was that 1994 would fall behind 1993 by
about $12.2 million in sales produced in the extra week, all things being
equal.51 In July 1994, Burlington announced that the sales attributable
to the extra week were $23.2 million, nearly double the amount
estimated earlier. Plaintiffs, investors who purchased shares during
1994, argued that investors calculated likely sales for 1994 by
extrapolating from the erroneous announcement.52 Relying on the lower
figure caused them to overestimate Burlington’s likely performance in
1994 and thereby inflated the stock’s price. Because no observable
stock-price change occurred when the correct extra-week figure was
49. See generally Michael L. Hartzmark & N. Nejat Seyhun, The Curious Incident of the Dog
that Didn’t Bark and Establishing Cause-and-Effect in Class Action Securities Litigation, 6 VA. L.
& BUS. REV. 415, 420–25 (2012) (reviewing multiple factors that can explain why there can be price
movement without an accompanying newsworthy announcement and how a newsworthy
announcement may not be accompanied by observable price movement).
50. 114 F.3d 1410, 1425 (3d Cir. 1997).
51. Id. at 1424.
52. Id.
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released in July 1994, the Third Circuit dismissed the claim, reasoning
that in an efficient market, if the correction of the earlier
understatement of the extra week’s sales was material, there would
have been a noticeable change in Burlington’s stock price.53
As seen, a company’s announcement of unexpected good news
(e.g., the receipt of a contract that will quadruple sales) can be expected
to favorably impact a security’s price in any market. Moreover,
investors likely believe the security’s price would be so impacted that
the principal justification for Basic’s embrace of fraud on the market
would appear satisfied if the company falsely claimed to have received
such a contract. Burlington Coat would also have concluded that the
price movement upon release of the correct $23.2 million extra-week
figure, had such price change occurred, would support the assertion
that the corrective announcement was material.
But changing the assumed facts of this simple illustration
reveals the inherent narrowness and unreliability of determining either
efficiency or materiality based on price response to the challenged
announcement. For example, what might be the likely effect of
announcing that the company had obtained a large contract if there
were substantial expectations that the company would be the winning
bidder? In this case, any expected favorable effect of the announcement
on the stock’s price could be due to the reduced uncertainty of whether
the firm would prevail. If that uncertainty were small, the price
reaction would be small, if not negligible. What, then, if the company
fibbed in announcing it had obtained the contract, perhaps fearing
repercussions if investor expectations were not met? Burlington Coat,
placing unqualified emphasis on price change, would hold there was no
material misrepresentation since the false announcement was not
accompanied by an observable price change.
This raises the question whether the absence of market
movement in Burlington Coat could be due to the fact that the corrected
statement of the $23.2 million benefit flowing from the extra week was
consistent with investor expectations of what they might have
53. Id. at 1426–27. By contrast, in No.84 Employer-Teamsters Joint Council Pension Trust
Fund v. America West Holdings Corp., the Ninth Circuit rejected a bright-line rule requiring an
immediate market reaction to the disclosed information for it to be deemed material; the court
reasoned that even an efficient market is “subject to distortions.” 320 F.3d 920, 934 (9th Cir. 2003)
(citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988)). In America West Holdings, there was no
detectable market response to newspaper reports that the airline was skimping on maintenance
and thereby reporting profitable operations, that it was the subject of an FAA safety investigation,
or that the airline’s own announcement that problems raised in the earlier news accounts had been
fully addressed with a settlement with the FAA. See id. at 925–30. This is puzzling because a few
months later the airline’s stock declined six points when it announced that third quarter earnings
declined due to unsatisfactory operational performance. See id. at 930.
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extrapolated from information that was available. This would not only
explain the absence of any price change once the corrected figure was
released but also justify dismissal of the case since announcement of
the earlier, lower figure of $12.2 million essentially harmed no one.
Otherwise, the correct disclosure of $23.2 million in extra sales could be
expected to elicit a different reaction from investors, since this amount
was not anticipated.54 In such instances, as well as in pure
nondisclosure cases, evidence of stock-price change following the
corrective announcement can substantiate the materiality assertion
and address whether the market is informationally efficient.
The muddle following Basic is attributable to a fundamental
flaw of Basic itself. The plurality opinion invoked a hypothesis that is
descriptive of the market and then incorrectly used that hypothesis to
describe investor behavior in response to the market. However, the
hypothesis is not descriptive of investor behavior. There is nothing in
the efficient market hypothesis that describes how investors behave;
the hypothesis only suggests the consequences of their collective
behavior.55 As such, the efficient market hypothesis is a non sequitur to
explain probable investor reliance.

54. Eight years later, the Supreme Court essentially embraced the same reasoning by
requiring evidence of loss causation for antifraud suits. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S.
336, 347–48 (2005). It may be better to view these cases not as instances of the alleged omitted or
misstatement failing to cause an economic loss but rather evidence that the misrepresentation did
not impact the security’s price. This distinction flows naturally from the test of materiality not
requiring proof that the alleged omission or misstatement changed the investors’ decisions to trade
or the price for the security.
55. Basic, in addition to lacking a solid theoretical foundation for its understanding of the
efficient market hypothesis, and in limiting fraud on the market to securities that trade in “welldeveloped markets,” also appears to be internally inconsistent with the reasoning used to reach
these conclusions. The Court reasoned that in efficient markets “[a]n investor who buys or sells
stock at the price set by the market does so in reliance on the integrity of that price.” Basic, 485
U.S. at 247. Since reliance under this formulation moves from reliance on the particular statement
made by the defendant to investor reliance on certain understood endowments of the market, why
then would it not be appropriate for the defendant to argue that aggregation of the investors’
claims was inappropriate because reliance by each investor on the integrity of the market’s pricing
of the security remains to be determined? This request should be denied only if the court were
prepared to hold that such reliance is nonrebuttable. Instead, Basic recognizes the defendant’s
right to probe each investor’s reliance, albeit the inquiry arises defensively. Thus, Basic’s dicta of
an investors’ presumed reliance on the material misrepresentation being rebutted by proof the
investor would have traded anyway appears to require individual inquiries into reliance. These
inquiries may be a basis for concluding that common questions of law and fact do not predominate.
Such an inquiry is unlikely to remove many investors from the class. Nonetheless, the process of
identifying the few affected viewed at the moment of making the certification question is as
daunting as inquiring whether each investor traded in the belief that market prices reflected only
truthful publication or, for that matter, whether the individual investor read the allegedly false
publication. In either case, hundreds of inquiries would destroy the efficiency of the class action
procedure.
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IV. RELIANCE: GENESIS, MEANING, AND FUNCTION
According to Basic, fraud on the market is all about reliance. But
why is reliance an element of the antifraud suit? The Second Circuit
solidified the incorporation of reliance into antifraud jurisprudence in
List v. Fashion Park, Inc.,56 reasoning that reliance is necessary “to
certify that the conduct of the defendant actually caused the plaintiff’s
injury.”57 The court observed that failing to require reliance would
eliminate “the principle of causation in fact.”58 After reviewing the
extensive trial record, List held that the district court properly
concluded that the plaintiffs would have sold their shares regardless of
whether they had known of the omitted facts.59
A. The Common-Law Analogy
List’s incorporation of reliance into antifraud jurisprudence
likely puzzles tort scholars. Duty is an overarching concern in the
development of tort law. For example, an individual is not responsible
to a plaintiff for his own negligent act or omission unless the individual
owes the plaintiff a duty to act with reasonable care. To determine if
the individual is responsible for harm caused by negligence, courts
inquire whether, under the circumstances, it was foreseeable that an
act or omission negligently committed would have harmed the plaintiff.
Reliance performs a similar function for the tort of misrepresentation.
One well-reasoned perspective is that reliance defines the tort of
misrepresentation at common law, so whether the plaintiff relied on the
defendant’s false representation does more than define who might
recover.60 Reliance, in fact, defines the defendant’s duty to speak
truthfully, since tort law limits the defendant’s duty not to misrepresent
to those who are either in privity with the defendant or whose actual
reliance could be foreseen.61
56. 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965), cert denied sub nom., List v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
There are, of course, much earlier references to reliance in private litigation under the antifraud
provision. See, e.g., Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 833 (D. Del. 1951) (allowing suit
to proceed because all members of the class relied on the defendant’s misrepresentations).
57. List, 340 F.2d at 462. In taking this position, the court liberally invoked the Restatement
of Torts as well as the leading treatises by Prosser and Harper. Id.
58. Id. at 463.
59. Id. at 464–65.
60. John C.P. Goldberg et al., The Place of Reliance in Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1001, 1002–03
(2006).
61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 531 (1977) (stating that a tortfeasor is liable for
damages resulting from “justifiable reliance in the type of transaction in which he intends or has
reason to expect their conduct to be influenced” (emphasis added)); see, e.g., Hafen v. Strebeck, 338
F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1265 (D. Utah 2004) (interpreting Minnesota precedent to determine that parties
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In contrast to the common-law action of misrepresentation or
deceit, the duty not to engage in material misrepresentations is clearly
and broadly set forth in Rule 10b-5. The duty exists without evidence of
reliance. Thus, an SEC enforcement action is successful without proof
that any investors relied on the misrepresentation. The violation is
complete upon showing that a material omission or misstatement was
committed in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.
Because reliance under securities laws serves a function other than
defining the duty the defendant owes the plaintiff, it should enjoy a role
distinct from causation in common-law torts. But what is that role?
An important qualification to the above analysis springs from
considering what interests the antifraud provision should protect. That
is, just why is it within the purpose of the antifraud rule to reach a
particular material omission or misstatement? More specifically, is
evidence of reliance a necessary component for assuring that the
interest protected by the antifraud provision is fulfilled in the particular
case? At the granular level, a material misrepresentation interdicts a
basic value of the securities laws, namely that of enabling full and fair
disclosure to investors. The reasons for seeking this goal are multiple62
and, at the level of a single “classic” investor, easy to defend: a material
misrepresentation that induces an investor to trade at a price she would
not otherwise have believed reasonable has harmed that investor.
Absent evidence that an investor’s decisionmaking is actually impaired,
engaged in arms-length, commercial transactions owe no duty of care for negligent misstatements
but do owe a duty of honesty, defined as “an inherent duty to be honest and not state intentional
misrepresentations”); In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 604–
06 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (holding that Texas law makes defendants liable for misrepresentation when
making false or misleading statements that create reliance in others in privity of contract with the
defendant or others about whom the defendant has information concerning an “especial likelihood”
that the party will rely on the tortfeasor’s statement); Consol. Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Ryan, 250 F. Supp.
600, 607 (W.D. Ark. 1966) (stating that Arkansas law recognizes that vendor/purchaser parties
with a long-term and trusting relationship owe each other a “duty of honesty” when a specific
request for information is made, any violation of which can constitute fraud or deceit independent
of a fiduciary relationship); Woodward v. Dietrich, 548 A.2d 301, 311–16 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)
(holding that a contractor who engaged in misrepresentation could be liable to future buyers of a
house who were not in privity of contract with the contractor but who foreseeably suffered from
harm resulting from the contractor’s misrepresentation to a previous buyer); Ernst & Young, LLP
v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 51 S.W.3d 573, 578–82 (Tex. 2001) (holding that despite Texas’s
unusually phrased law concerning reliance, misrepresentors are liable in tort for damages
resulting from reliance by parties in privity of contract or parties about whom the misrepresentor
has information concerning an “especial likelihood” that the party will rely on the tortious
statement, consistent with the “reason to expect” language in section 531 of the Second
Restatement of Torts).
62. See James D. Cox, Coping in a Global Marketplace: Survival Strategies for a 75-Year Old
SEC, 95 VA. L. REV. 941, 959–61 (2009) (listing as objectives sought by disclosure and antifraud
provisions identifying capital allocation, facilitating investor decisionmaking, deterring fraud, and
disciplining managers).
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there is no cause to believe that the hallowed objective of full and fair
disclosure was violated. Thus, reliance by the investor on the
misrepresentation closes the circle and underscores the policy served by
according that investor standing to sue for conduct inconsistent with
the antifraud provision.63
But the illustration is quaint. A good deal of investment
behavior is driven by decisions unrelated to a particular kernel of
material information. For example, a financial institution’s decision to
purchase may be due to portfolio rebalancing arising from its obeisance
to an indexing strategy. Or consider the lay investor who purchases the
shares of an industry leader based on financial reports that the
particular industry should do well in the forthcoming fiscal period.64
In light of the wide range of possible investor behavior, the focus
of the antifraud provision should not be limited to protecting investor
decisionmaking in the narrow context of non-open market-trading
venues; certainly discriminating among such different approaches to
investing appears hard to justify if each approach is, to some extent,
guided substantially by faith in the overall integrity of that market.
Because a violation exists without demanding evidence that investor
judgments were adversely affected by the misrepresentation, at least in
SEC enforcement actions, the conduct does not become less of a
violation or less harmful to the investor if the complainant is a private
party who did not rely on the material misrepresentation itself. Thus,
in the open market context, securities laws should at least serve the
more generalized objective of assuring investors that the markets are
not rigged or otherwise populated by fraudulent information. This
observation appears vital to Justice Blackmun’s discussion of the role
presumptions play in the resolution of disputes—advancing a public
interest such as maintaining the integrity of capital markets.65
To be sure, there is intuitive appeal to the idea that defendants
in private suits should not be financially responsible for having made a
materially false statement if that statement played no role in the
plaintiff’s loss. This concern reflects an understanding of reliance. That
63. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Trouble with Basic: Price Distortion After Halliburton, 90
WASH. U. L. REV. 895, 895, 912, 914 (2013). Professor Fisch wisely observes that, in its traditional
appearance, securities fraud was proscribed to protect “the autonomy of the investment decision”
so that investors “are not deceived into trading.” Id. at 914, 916. With a focus on price, which occurs
in fraud on the market, the focus shifts to protecting investors who seek to “trade at a price
undistorted by fraud.” Id. at 914. The point of this Article is that each fits within the purpose of
the antifraud provision, but that the means to establishing causality is different with reliance
serving the former and is not necessary in the latter. Reliance therefore is a tool, not an objective.
64. See, e.g., Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365, 366 (2d Cir. 1981), vacated as moot sub nom.,
Price Waterhouse v. Panzirer, 459 U.S. 1027 (1982).
65. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988).
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is, reliance, at least in the one-on-one situation where the plaintiff deals
directly with the defendant, serves the critical function of linking the
plaintiff’s economic loss to the defendant’s misconduct. In this context,
the investors’ reliance supports both that the statute’s purpose was
violated and that the violation induced the plaintiff’s trade. It does not,
however, make the case that the trade caused financial harm to the
relying investor. More would need to be established before the
defendant is required to compensate the investor for the harm suffered
by relying on the defendant’s misrepresentation. This is as it should be.
Causality is an inherent and desirable element in private litigation.
Reliance can be seen as one means to establish part of the required
causality but not as the sole means for establishing causation or for
linking the defendant’s violation with the plaintiff’s injury. So viewed,
reliance is part of the causation inquiry. Basic and now Amgen invites
consideration of whether reliance is a meaningless cog in the causation
wheel when fraud is perpetrated impersonally on an open market.
B. Causation Is Context Specific
It is important for causality to be independently determined in
securities fraud suits. That is, requiring proof of reliance or establishing
causation does not render materiality superfluous. The standard for
materiality is not conditioned on the defendant’s omission or
misstatement impacting the plaintiff’s, or for that matter anyone else’s,
investment decision. The test for materiality, first announced by the
Supreme Court in the context of proxy-statement omissions, “does not
require proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted
fact would have caused the reasonable investor to change his vote.”66
Rather, materiality requires “a showing of a substantial likelihood that,
under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed
actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable” investor or
shareholder.67
This formulation necessarily means that there are many facts
that can be material under the circumstances but would not have
changed the investors’ decision to trade at a particular price, had they
been disclosed. It is this mismatch between materiality and causality
that produces so much of the tension around the scope of fraud on the
market. Fraud on the market does relax the inquiry into causality by
dispensing with individual inquiries into investor reliance and, thus,
can place more weight on the broader standard of materiality. The
66. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
67. Id.
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application of fraud on the market can be tweaked to address this
problem of overinclusive recoveries. However, limiting fraud on the
market to securities traded in markets with certain characteristics (e.g.,
market capitalization and number of analysts) does not address the
problem at all. On the other hand, evidence that a security’s price
moved following the release of the allegedly false announcement or the
correction of an earlier false announcement demonstratively addresses
the disconnect that otherwise exists between materiality and causality.
Were materiality to serve the dual purposes of guiding whether
omissions or misstatements are actionable as well as laying the
foundation for proving causation, the standard would be inherently
overinclusive. Under the Court’s analysis, a fact is material irrespective
of whether its omission or misstatement actually changes the investor’s
decision, so long as there is a substantial likelihood that the fact would
have assumed actual significance in the reasonable investors’
deliberations. Proof of reliance by the investor moves the inquiry into
the representation’s causative impact. The reliance element is
necessary when a piece of information may be significant to an
objectively qualified investor but, due to a variety of unique
circumstances, does not assume actual significance to the plaintiff in a
particular case. Some additional filter is therefore needed because the
plaintiff’s circumstances may not match the objective standard of the
reasonable investor. More likely, the omitted or misstated fact may not
have been so probative as to alter the plaintiff’s investment decision
from what it would have been had there been no omission or
misstatement. Thus, a robust inquiry into the plaintiff’s reliance
overcomes the overbreadth of the materiality standard. In this way,
reliance links the violation with the plaintiff’s loss. That is, reliance is
truly a means for determining causality. The allegation of reliance,
however, is not the only method for establishing causation.
The preceding view of reliance is consistent with the Court’s
holding in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, which reversed the
circuit court’s dismissal of the action because the investors failed to
establish their reliance.68 The Court succinctly reversed the lower court,
holding that “[u]nder the circumstances of this case, involving primarily
a failure to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to
recovery. All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be
material . . . .”69 To many lower courts and commentators, Affiliated Ute
assigns double duty to the element of materiality; they believe that
68. 406 U.S. 128, 152–53 (1972), aff’g in part, rev’g in part Reyos v. United States, 431 F.2d
1337 (10th Cir. 1970).
69. Id. at 153.
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proof of materiality establishes both the importance of the alleged
misrepresentation and that the misrepresentation assumed sufficient
significance to establish that it induced the plaintiff to trade. This
conclusion not only ascribes too limited significance to the qualifier
“under the circumstances of this case” but also overlooks the facts before
the Court. The Affiliated Ute plaintiffs were unsophisticated, the
defendants unquestionably stood in a position of trust to the plaintiffs,
the defendants had a backlog of eager buyers for the shares at prices
substantially above the price at which the plaintiffs sold their shares to
the defendants, and the defendants garnered enormous profits through
their representation of the plaintiffs.70 Thus, Affiliated Ute’s egregious
facts far more persuasively establish causation than would a
hypothetical inquiry into the plaintiff’s reliance on an event that never
occurred. This raises the question whether causality is only resolved by
reliance. Affiliated Ute’s unique facts, and the Court’s reference to
“under the circumstances of this case,” clearly support the view that
causation can be addressed in multiple ways.
C. Causation in Collective Decisionmaking
In the corporate setting, many decisions are the composite of
individual decisions of shareholders. Thus, acquisitions, amendments
to articles, and even dissolution involve securities transactions for
which private suits are available when they are accompanied by
material misrepresentations. In Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., the
Court confronted how causation is addressed within the setting of group
decisionmaking.71 The Court concluded, albeit generally, that causation
is established by proof that “the proxy solicitation itself, rather than the
particular defect in the solicitation materials, was an essential link in
the accomplishment of the transaction.”72 The essence of this test is that
causation exists when the soliciting defendant lacks sufficient voting
power to approve the transaction solely by voting the shares controlled
by the defendant.73 The Court reasoned that this approach avoided the
70. Id. at 145–47. In TSC Industries, the Court defined materiality for the first time. 426 U.S.
at 449. In doing so, the Court expressly rejected the looser standard that the misrepresentation
“might” assume significance to the reasonable investor. Id. at 445–47. In dicta, Affiliated Ute
invoked the “might” standard. 406 U.S. at 153–54. As seen, TSC Industries unhinged the
materiality test from the misrepresentation’s ultimate impact on the plaintiff’s decision to buy,
sell, or vote. 426 U.S. at 449.
71. 396 U.S. 375, 379 (1970).
72. Id. at 385.
73. See, e.g., Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1106, 1108 (1991) (finding
causation missing where defendant’s ownership far surpassed the percentage needed to assure
approval of the company’s sale based on materially misleading proxy solicitation); Mills, 396 U.S.
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difficulties of determining how many votes were affected by the
material omission or misstatement; any doubt regarding the
misrepresentation’s probable impact on stockholder voting is better
resolved in favor of voting shareholders—the group Congress intended
to be the beneficiary of the regulatory provision.74
Shareholder voting decisions are collective because the will of
the majority binds the many. Even the extraordinary stockholder who
knew—through resourcefulness, blind luck, or unique talents—that the
circulated proxy statement was misleading, and therefore voted against
the resolution, is bound by the result if the transaction is nonetheless
approved. Thus, even though the materially misleading proxy
statement did not interfere with that stockholder’s voting decision, it
nonetheless was the causal link to the harm befalling the nonduped
shareholder. Mills shows how aggregations of individual actors not only
make group decisions, but also suffer as a group. Whether the voting
shareholder relied or did not rely in this context does not make the harm
greater or smaller.
Mills demonstrates that the inquiry into causality is not only
more encompassing than the inquiry into reliance, but that reliance
itself can be irrelevant in establishing causation. When it comes to
causality, as the Court emphasized in Affiliated Ute, the circumstances
not only matter, they matter a lot.
Embracing the framework that causation is established by
evidence that the misrepresentation distorted the security’s price
creates a clean path forward for clarifying Basic. This would effectively
render all members of the class price takers rather than pricemakers
without focusing on their role in “making” the price. As price takers,
investors would be analogous to the proxy voters in Mills, where the
Court held it was neither practicable nor desirable to inquire into
whether each voting stockholder had been duped by the omission. It
was sufficient that the defendant lacked enough votes to assure
approval of the merger. A price-distortion method of interpreting fraud
on the market could build on this approach. The approach would require
reorienting Basic and now Amgen from its emphasis on investor
reliance on the pricing process for the securities to whether the price
itself had been affected. Nonetheless, it is more consistent with Basic
and Amgen to remain focused on whether the security’s trading
characteristics are consistent with presumptions regarding investors’
reliance on the trustworthiness of the market in which the security was
at 385 n.7 (expressing uncertainty as to whether causation would be an essential link where the
defendant held sufficient voting power to approve the transaction for which proxies were solicited).
74. Mills, 396 U.S. at 1104–06.
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traded. To be sure, evidence of price distortion would be probative of
how the security’s prices responded to publicly available information.
But other information would also be at hand to support or reject
assertions that investors relied on the integrity of that security’s
market.
V. AMGEN’S CLARIFICATION
Amgen presents an example of how the contemporary
construction of the antifraud provision pleases neither of the
combatants in securities class action suits. The Amgen class was
composed of investors who purchased Amgen shares during a period
when Amgen allegedly made several material misrepresentations
regarding two of its major pharmaceutical products, Epogen and
Aranesp.75 There were two issues before the Court. First, as a condition
of class certification, should the plaintiffs be required to establish the
materiality of the alleged misrepresentations?76 Second, should the
defendant be accorded the opportunity to rebut the assertion of
materiality by showing that the truth behind each of the alleged
misrepresentations had already entered the marketplace?77 Defendants
predictably wanted these issues to be part of the class certification
decision so as to reduce the hydraulic pressure that class certification
places on settlement even though those issues were unresolved.78
Correlatively, the plaintiffs naturally preferred fewer substantive
determinations in the all-critical certification stage.79
Amgen’s significance does not lie in how it resolved these
opposing tugs. As examined more closely below, four justices joined
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion, which held that a finding on the merits of
any substantive element of the antifraud suit is not a precondition to
class certification.80 To the Amgen majority, courts deciding whether to
certify the class should only examine whether common questions of law
and fact predominate, so that their collective resolution makes a class
action the appropriate procedural mechanism.81 The majority ruled that
conditioning certification on proof of the alleged misrepresentation’s
materiality would put the cart of substantive adjudication before the
75. A full narrative of the facts appears in Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds v.
Amgen Inc., 660 F.3d 1170, 1172–73 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013).
76. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (2013).
77. Id. at 1203.
78. Id. at 1191, 1203.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1191.
81. Id.
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horse of procedure.82 Justice Alito concurred, but did so by expressing
his interest in revisiting the substantive theory on which common
questions in securities fraud claims depend—the fraud-on-the-market
presumption of market causation.83 Less cautious than Justice Alito
were the three dissenters who believed the Court should revisit Basic’s
embrace of fraud on the market.84 Thus, Amgen houses the dog that
would not bark—the continuing vitality of the securities class action.
Amgen did not, as some had hoped, depart from the “reliance”
rhetoric.85 Furthermore, it repeatedly references “efficient”86 and
“efficiency”87 when describing the instances in which the fraud-on-themarket approach to causation is applicable. The references are,
therefore, more specific than Basic’s plurality, which more generally
referred to “well-developed” markets.88 What distinguishes Amgen is
the majority’s gloss on their use of “efficient” and “efficiency.” They
invoked these terms to describe the natural incorporation of financially
significant information into security prices.89 Therefore, Amgen’s
significance rests on the move from this observation to conclude that
most investors “rely on the security’s market price as an unbiased
assessment of the security’s value in light of all public information.”90
Missing in Amgen is the emphasis present in Basic that the critical
reliance is that of investors on the market; in Amgen, there is a subtle
shift away from some markets having characteristics that attract
investors’ reliance on security prices to a broader view where the focus
is on the pricing process and not the market itself. Moreover, Amgen
does not require that the security historically reflected all material
public information as a condition of market efficiency. Instead, the
majority recognized that a security can be deemed traded in an efficient
market if its shares “generally” reflect publicly available information.
Amgen offers the following explanation of how the fraud-on-the-market
presumption is justified:
This presumption springs from the very concept of market efficiency. If a market is
generally efficient in incorporating publicly available information into a security’s market
price . . . it is reasonable to presume that most investors—knowing that they have little
hope of outperforming the market in the long run based solely on their analysis of publicly
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1204 (Alito, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 1216 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
85. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 63, at 39 (observing that reliance is inconsistent with the
efficient market hypothesis and therefore illogical in the context of market-based harm).
86. Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1188, 1192–93.
87. Id. at 1192, 1199.
88. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246–47 (1988).
89. Amgen, 133 S. Ct. 1192–93.
90. Id. at 1192.
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available information—will rely on the security’s market price as an unbiased assessment
of the security’s value in light of all public information. Thus, courts may presume that
investors trading in efficient markets indirectly rely on public, material
misrepresentations through their “reliance on the integrity of the price set by the
market.”91

Amgen, however, does not render price distortion a litmus test
for fraud on the market’s application;92 Amgen instead invites evidence
of efficient pricing of the company’s securities. The majority’s sense of
what constitutes efficiency is a market that regularly reflects publicly
available information. This would appear to reject the lengthy list of
criteria that lower courts have developed as the gateway for certifying
a class based on fraud on the market. Simply stated, Amgen invites the
testing of market efficiency through empirical observation, namely
evidence of how a particular security’s price has responded to financial
announcements.
Additionally, Amgen establishes that a security can be traded in
an efficient market even though that market does not always
incorporate publicly available information into a security’s price. Thus,
Amgen rejects the numerous holdings in the circuit courts that
condition fraud on the market on evidence that a firm’s security
regularly reflected all publicly available information.93 This rejection
invites lower courts to consider how to rule when a security’s price does
not respond to financially significant information: is the absence of
observable price movement evidence that the market is inefficient or
that an efficient market is documenting the immateriality of the
information? Amgen also notes that not all investors harbor the same
belief regarding the futility of earning above average returns by trading
on public information. In all respects, Amgen moves the framework of
fraud on the market closer to what is supported by the efficient market
literature.

91. Id. at 1192–93 (emphasis added) (quoting Basic, 485 U.S. at 245). Central to Amgen’s
holding was Amgen’s concession that the alleged misrepresentations were public and that its
securities traded in an efficient market, so that “the market for Amgen’s securities promptly
digested current information regarding Amgen from all publicly available sources and reflected
such information in Amgen’s stock price.” Id. at 1193.
92. Professor Donald Langevoort reports that at least Justice William Brennan, part of the
thin plurality opinion, preferred a more permissive approach to causation where proof that the
misrepresentation distorted the security’s price established causation without inquiry into any
form of investor reliance. Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market,
2009 WIS. L. REV. 151, 157 & n.25. Amgen would appear not to change the result in GAMCO
Investors, Inc. v. Vivendi, S.A., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 97,306 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (dismissing a
claim where the security’s price, even though distorted by fraudulent statements, assumed no
importance in the investment model used by the investor).
93. See supra note 34.
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VI. SCALIA’S NEAR HIT
Justice Scalia, separately dissenting, offers an intriguing
interpretation of Basic. Rather than denying any access to fraud on the
market, he and the other dissenters would require evidence of
materiality for certification of the class, reasoning that Basic itself
premised its presumption on investors’ presumed reliance on the
security’s price being impacted by a material misrepresentation.94
Justice Scalia’s reasoning bears some promise for how courts can
handle fraud-on-the-market suits in the future.
Presumably, Justice Scalia would have upheld class certification
if the plaintiffs in Amgen alleged that the defendant’s various
announcements produced an observable price increase. Similarly,
Justice Scalia would have found comfort in Basic’s certification because
the alleged facts showed that each of the three denials was accompanied
by an observable price drop in Basic’s share prices. The plaintiffs,
however, alleged neither of these scenarios in Amgen, most likely
because there was no observable price adjustment. Indeed, the factual
configuration of each is similar to that of PolyMedica. Each involves a
disclosure alleged to be materially misleading without confirming any
change in the issuer’s operations or situation. For example, Basic
falsely confirmed there would be no value-increasing merger, and
Amgen confirmed its product was safe. Each, like PolyMedica, offered
reassurance that past would be prologue as the nondisclosure confirmed
already-held expectations by investors. In precisely these situations,
observing market movement is nearly impossible. There, the Court’s
earlier decision in Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo95 plays an
important role.
In Dura, the Court held that in order to survive a motion to
dismiss, the complaint must do more than broadly allege that a
material misrepresentation inflated a security’s price; the plaintiff
must allege loss causation with particularity (i.e., that an observable
price correction occurred upon release of the correct information). As a
result, stock-price movement assumes significance in fraud-on-themarket cases, since allegations of price movement following a corrective
disclosure provide prima facie support of loss causation. At the same
time, a price-correction allegation can also support assertions that an
earlier misstatement or omission was indeed material. Thus, even

94. 133 S. Ct. at 1205 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
95. 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005).
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though Amgen and Erica P. John Fund v. Halliburton96 rejected the
necessity of corroboration for class certification, an empirical inquiry
into price correction can resolve whether the security traded in a
market whose properties for that type of announcement are sufficient
to justify Basic’s presumption of investor reliance.97
Therefore, what may separate Justice Scalia from the Amgen
majority is disagreement over the time at which evidence of stock-price
movement should be interjected into the suit. The majority believes
requiring proof of materiality as a condition to certification places the
resolution of a central factual element into the pretrial stage, the
certification of the class; the majority believed proof of this element was
common to all members of the class. At the same time, the Court’s
decision in Dura requires that a complaint set forth facts establishing
loss causation in order to survive a motion to dismiss. Thus, pursuant
to Dura, Amgen should have been dismissed if all the complaint alleges
is that Amgen’s false statements caused its price to increase but failed
to allege any price correction following Amgen’s later corrective
announcement.
With these potential scenarios in mind, is more at stake in
Amgen, and earlier in Halliburton, than the procedural question of
whether materiality and loss causation must be addressed via a motion
to dismiss or as conditions for class certification? Each procedural rule
poses a burden on the plaintiff at the pleading stage. If Amgen and
Halliburton had each been decided differently, the burden confronting
the plaintiff would have been more formidable; the standard would
require that a preponderance of the evidence support the claim of
materiality and loss causation, consistent with what courts have done
on other class certification issues (e.g., whether the security was traded
in an efficient market). Should the choice be influenced by whether the
class certification decision occurs only after resolution of motions to
dismiss and summary judgment?
Each party likely seeks an early decision on certification of the
class. With the class certified, even preliminarily, the plaintiff enjoys
the hydraulic pressure that decision places on the defendant to settle.

96. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2186 (2011) (holding Fifth
Circuit erred in requiring evidence of loss causation as a condition to certifying the class). The
Court, similar to the Court in Amgen, stressed that loss causation, unlike reliance, does not
implicate commonality. Therefore, the inquiry into loss causation is not germane to class
certification.
97. The Ninth Circuit reached a very curious result in Miller v. Thane International, Inc.,
holding that although the market for the defendant company’s stock was not efficient per the
Cammer standards, nonetheless the absence of stock-price change upon revelation of the truth
established the absence of loss causation. 615 F.3d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 2010).
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If the defendant prevails and the suit is not certified as a class, the suit
disappears; if the defendant loses on class certification, it can still
retain hope that its other pretrial motions will be successful. Moreover,
the defendant enjoys another strategic advantage by advancing class
certification before other pretrial motions: until all pretrial motions are
resolved, the plaintiff does not enjoy discovery rights, so that in doing
battle on many issues that can be in dispute for class certification, the
plaintiff could have much less information than if the contest over class
certification followed all the pretrial motions. In a nondisclosure case,
the absence of discovery could hinder the plaintiffs’ ability to identify
when the defendant became aware of certain information. This
knowledge would have helped plaintiffs’ experts isolate probable impact
of disclosures on a security’s price in order to demonstrate the
informational efficiency of the market.
Therefore, there is less distance separating Justice Scalia from
the Amgen majority than meets the eye, assuming each camp is willing
to look holistically at the facts. Why should a factual allegation about
loss causation that is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss not also
be probative of the alleged materiality for class certification?
Procedurally, the allegations in the complaint are tested on the
assumption that they are correct. Therefore, the motion to dismiss tilts
favorably toward the plaintiff. By contrast, the plaintiff does not enjoy
deference in factually intensive class certification hearings. But, if the
class certification hearings occurred after ample opportunity for
discovery, a fuller examination of the suit would result. The plaintiffs’
bar may prefer if the Amgen majority swung more toward Justice
Scalia’s perspective of Basic and focused on price distortion, instead of
a poorly conceived assessment of market efficiency and a conditional
presumption of reliance. Nonetheless, Amgen’s repeated references to
“efficient” and “efficiency” and the Amgen majority’s view that these
expressions refer to stocks that trade in informationally efficient
markets cabin fraud on the market to such markets rather than on a
bare showing of price distortion itself. This formulation thus invites a
more probing inquiry of whether the trading in that security likely
would be impacted by information alleged to be misstated or omitted,
not just of narrow features of the individual security’s market.
The Court’s earlier decision in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin
proves instructive on this point.98 Eisen involved a securities class
action with approximately six million class members. After a hearing,
the district court accepted the plaintiff’s position that notice to members
98. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177–78 (1974), aff’g 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir.
1973), rev’g 54 F.R.D. 565, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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of the class could be provided by publication and assigned ninety
percent of the notice cost to the defendants based on its finding that the
class would likely prevail on the merits.99 The circuit court reversed the
ruling,100 and the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit’s decision,
reasoning as follows:
We find nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a court any
authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine
whether it may be maintained as a class action. Indeed, such a procedure contravenes the
Rule by allowing a representative plaintiff to secure the benefits of a class action without
first satisfying the requirements for it. He is thereby allowed to obtain a determination
on the merits of the claims advanced on behalf of the class without any assurance that a
class action may be maintained.101

Importantly, both the circuit and Supreme Court decisions
rejected a hearing that focused on the suit’s merits. The Supreme Court
emphasized that a preliminary hearing on the merits could prejudice
the case against the defendant since such a hearing likely would not be
accompanied by traditional rules of evidence and procedure.102
However, it is consistent with Eisen to have such a hearing focus on
issues relevant to class certification,103 such as whether the particular
security traded in an informationally efficient market.104 That is, Eisen
does not foreclose lower courts from merit-based-like findings that link
to whether the suit meets Rule 23’s criteria for class certification.
Indeed, hearings today are regularly held and evidentiary findings are
made when class certification depends on whether a security traded in
an efficient market such that the suit can be maintained on a fraud-onthe-market theory. This occurs even though there may well be

99. 54 F.R.D. at 573.
100. 479 F.2d at 1015–16.
101. 417 U.S. at 177–78.
102. Id. at 178.
103. See, e.g., Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982) (stating that “sometimes
it may be necessary for the court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the
certification question,” even though such a determination “generally involves considerations that
are ‘enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff’s cause of action’ ” (quoting
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 (1978))); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,
131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552 & n.6 (2011) (reaffirming the holding of Falcon, but clarifying that the Court
found “nothing in . . . Rule 23 . . . gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into
the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action”).
104. See In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 41–42 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that
the trial judge is responsible for making factual findings about whether conditions for fraud on the
market have been satisfied); Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 369 (4th Cir. 2004)
(reversing district court for failing to inquire beyond factual allegations in complaint to determine
whether there was sufficient basis to invoke fraud on the market). See generally Patricia Groot,
Note, Fraud on the Market Gets a Minitrial: Eisen Through In re IPO, 58 DUKE L.J. 1143, 1166
(2009) (showing that the holdings in Eisen and Falcon allow courts to consider relevant factual
issues in making a decision on class certification).
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important overlaps between factors relevant to such a class certification
determination and issues bearing on the ultimate merits of the suit.
What has changed in Amgen is clarification by the Amgen majority that
investor reliance is presumed where the market is informationally
efficient, which, as reasoned here, is a condition that can and should be
determined through empirical observation.
VII. CONCLUSION: MATCHING THE APPROACH WITH TODAY’S MARKETS
Basic projected how reasonable investors are presumed to
behave based on a hypothesis of how securities markets perform. While
it did so on the infant base of literature supporting the efficient market
hypothesis, it also justified the presumption more traditionally,
anchored in “fairness, public policy and probability, as well as judicial
economy.”105 The world has moved on since that presumption was first
formulated.
For example, institutional investors who owned about twentyfour percent of public firms’ equities in 1980 owned seventy percent in
2010. The typical NYSE-listed company had about fifty-four
institutional holders in 1980; now such firms have 405 institutional
shareholders. As assets have aggregated, passive management of funds
has grown more common. Thus, more than one-third of total mutual
fund and exchange traded fund assets are passively managed.106
Indeed, the average annual growth of passive assets promoted through
mutual funds and exchange-traded funds has been twenty-six percent,
compared to just thirteen percent for actively managed funds.107 This
rapid movement toward passive investment, namely through indexing
strategies, is mirrored by changes occurring with other institutional
investors. For example, the giant pension fund CalPERS has invested
more than one-half of its $255 billion portfolio in passive strategies and
is actively considering a move to a totally passive portfolio.108
Aside from the overt move toward passive investing, there is
growing evidence that herding exists among institutional investors,
105. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988).
106. A Steady Climb for Indexing, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 2013, at R1 fig.
107. Rodney N. Sullivan & James X. Xiong, How Index Trading Increases Market
Vulnerability, 68 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 70, 73 (2012).
108. Jason Kephart, Passive Investing: If It’s Good Enough for CalPERS . . .,
INVESTMENTNEWS (Mar. 24, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/
20130324/FREE/130329970; see also Passive Equity Portfolios of 10 Large Pension Funds,
PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.pionline.com/gallery/20130325/
SLIDESHOW2/325009999 (listing percentages of passive investment for several large pension
funds where the range for the top five for their equity portfolio was seventy-two to ninety-three
percent).
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according to developed “style”-characteristics-favored sectors. Pursuant
to this practice, money managers and individual investors view
securities as part of a group having shared characteristics and not as
individual items. Herding ensues when investors seek to mimic the
returns garnered earlier by investors moving into a particular style or
category of investment. As a consequence, investment decisions are not
guided by the cash flows of the individual firm but rather the riskreturn profile of the group.109 Neither passive investing nor style
investing defy the presumption as formulated in Basic because neither
is centered on the price of the individual firm’s security; rather, both
strategies focus more generally on the overall integrity of securities
markets.110
Basic’s supposition that investors rely on the price of a
particular security is quaint in light of the dramatic changes that have
occurred in equity markets and investment strategies. When the Court
revisits Basic, which appears likely, it should bear in mind that
markets, and particularly trading strategies, have changed markedly
since fraud on the market was first conceived. The changes in markets,
especially the moves toward increasing amounts of passive investing,
are a testament to investors’ foundational belief that markets are fair.
It is this presumptive fairness—and the facts that attract investors to
have this belief—that should guide courts in deciding whether a trade
in a particular security should enjoy the protection of fraud on the
market because that security traded in a market that shared this broad
investor belief. It is a belief more broadly based than the security’s
price; it is founded on assumptions of the pricing process itself. Of
course, the Court could continue to adhere to the binary view that
markets are either efficient or not efficient, as determined by a set of
criteria divorced from empirical or theoretical support. Another option
is to rid the courts of fraud on the market and thereby deprive most
investors of the only means by which they can recoup funds lost due to
fraud. Neither of these latter two approaches is as compelling as
applying fraud on the market based on the assumptions that do, in fact,
underlie investor engagement in public markets.

109. Nicholas Barberis & Andrei Shleifer, Style Investing, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 161, 162 (2003).
Some empirical evidence shows that style investing exists. See, e.g., Nicole Choi & Richard W. Sias,
Institutional Industry Herding, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 469, 486 (2009) (concluding that institutional
investors engage in style investing in a “herding” pattern); Kenneth Froot & Melvyn Teo, Style
Investing and Institutional Investors, 43 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 883, 891 (2008)
(showing that major institutional investors chase trends in investing).
110. It is not likely that vendors, particularly those with a fiduciary relationship to their
beneficiaries and customers, could pursue an indexing strategy without a basic belief that
securities prices are not significantly affected by fraud.
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The position advanced in this Article is that Amgen’s clear
embrace of informational efficiency as the cornerstone of fraud on the
market rids the theory of its once-binary quality. Now, courts can fully
examine the information processing capabilities of the market in which
a security is traded. The objective of that examination is whether
investor expectations that information of the type alleged to have been
misleading would customarily be impounded in the security’s price. If
so, investor reliance would be presumed, so that the class could be
certified pursuant to fraud on the market.

